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"The education industry has long shown a masterful skill in obtaining public funds; for example, 
universities and colleges have received federal funds exceeding $3 billion annually in recent years, as 
well as subsidized loans for dormitories and other construction.... [But] the premier universities have not 
devised a method of excluding other claimants for research funds, and in the long run they will receive 
much-reduced shares of federal research monies." 
  -- Stigler, George  (1971),  “The theory of economic regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 4-5.  
 
 
Lobbying expenditures exceed $2 billion per year in the United States, more than three 
times the campaign contributions given by political action committees or PACs (Timothy 
Groseclose et al 2000).  Many voters view such spending with suspicion, and the popular press 
frequently cites it as prima facie evidence of the power of “pressure groups, each promoting its 
own special interests, [to] prevent elected politicians from adopting policies that are in the 
interest of the electorate as a whole” (Economist 1999).  Yet remarkably little is known about the 
economic returns actually obtained by lobbying organizations.  Despite sixty-five years of 
theoretical and empirical investigation,
1 and a steadily increasing interest by the press and 
electorate, there are no large-scale statistical studies of the returns to lobbying.
2  
The dearth of statistical studies of lobbying is largely due to four challenges in data 
collection and measurement. First, it is difficult to measure lobbying expenditures.  Second, 
many government policies lack identifiable pecuniary returns, thus making it difficult to measure 
the monetary value of policy outcomes that have been influenced by lobbying.  Third, 
                                                 
1 There are robust sets of theories on information transmission in lobbying, focusing on who lobbies and gains 
access (David Austen-Smith 1995; Gary S. Becker 1983; Randall L. Calvert 1985; John Mark Hansen 1991), who is 
lobbied (Austen-Smith 1993; E.E. Schattschneider 1935; Julio Rotemberg 2002), how legislators receive and 
process the information (Scott Ainsworth 1993; Rui J. de Figueiredo et al 1999; Lester W. Milbraith 1963, Kay L. 
Scholzman and John T. Tierney 1986), and the organizational form of lobbying (Mancur Olson 1965; John M. de 
Figueiredo and Emerson H. Tiller 2001).  For a good overview of interest group lobbying theory and evidence, see 
John R. Wright (1996).   
2 Since Schattschneider’s (1935) work on trade policy 65 years ago, scholars have sought to measure the impact of 
lobbying on policy outcomes.  Most of the empirical work is composed of case studies (e.g. Raymond Bauer et al 
1963).  Statistical work has comprised measures of lobbying which are coarse at best:  a count or intensity measure 
of lobbying contacts from surveys of lobbyists (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Wright 1990; Ken Kollman 1997), 
the presence of a Washington office and lobbyists (Douglas Schuler 1999; Scholzman and Tierney 1986), and 
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lobbying, PAC contributions, and grassroots lobbying, creating statistical challenges to 
estimating the returns to lobbying.  Finally, it is difficult to control for the intrinsic quality 
differences among competing lobbying interests.   
In this paper, we overcome these challenges by studying the returns to lobbying in a 
particularly conducive context: lobbying efforts by universities to obtain “earmark” grants.  
Earmarks, which are written into appropriations bills by legislators, allocate money directly to 
projects at specific universities, thus bypassing the competitive peer review process.  This 
context enables us to overcome the empirical challenges described above.  First, the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995 allows us to measure university lobbying expenditures, and other 
techniques described below allow us to allocate lobbying expenditures to the pursuit of earmark 
grants.  Second, earmarks are specified in dollar terms in legislation and targeted to particular, 
identifiable educational institutions, overcoming problems of measurement of the dependent 
variable.  Third, universities seeking to influence legislators have few options besides lobbying, 
because most universities, as non-profit institutions, are legally prohibited from using PAC 
contributions or grassroots political organization to convey their preferences to legislators, 
overcoming the estimation and confounding causal issues.  Finally, we are able to control for 
quality differences in interest groups with different systems of departmental rankings of 
universities.  
Although our interest in academic earmarking is driven primarily by our desire to 
estimate the returns to lobbying, the funding of academic research is an important topic in its 
own right.  The U.S. higher education system is widely seen as key engine of U.S. economic 
growth, both through the training of students and through research discovery (Claudia Goldin 
and Lawrence F. Katz 1999; David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg 1993). Federal funding of 
academic research has been a central component of the United States university system for 
decades, providing roughly 60 percent of all university research funds since World War II 
(Richard R. Nelson & Nathan Rosenberg 1994), and reaching $17 billion in FY2001.  Most of 
this funding is distributed at the discretion of central funding organizations unaffiliated with 
Congress, such as the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation, and rely 
                                                                                                                                                             
proxies such as PAC contributions (Ian Maitland 1983; Randall S. Kroszner and Phil Strahan 1999).  For an 
overview of the empirical papers, see Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech (1998).  
  2on peer review (or other competitive selection processes) of research proposals to allocate funds.  
In contrast, academic earmark requests are evaluated and granted by elected legislators and their 
staffs.  Expenditures on academic earmarks have risen over the past 20 years and now account 
for almost 10 percent of government funding of university research (Jeffery Brainard  and Ron 
Southwick 2001).  It is therefore not surprising that academic earmarking has received increasing 
attention in the policy literature recently (James D. Savage 1999; David Malakoff 2001a, 2001b).  
Despite this increased interest, there has thus far been no published systematic statistical analysis 
of the earmarking process.
3 
Finally, the debate over academic earmarking also fits within the broader literature on the 
structure of government.  Broadly speaking, the debate over earmarking mirrors the literature on 
“good government” and the effect of rent-seeking on government productivity.  Kevin M. 
Murphy et al. (1993) demonstrate that rent-seeking behavior is subject to increasing returns, 
suggesting that an initially small amount of rent-seeking behavior can spiral upward toward a 
high-rent-seeking equilibrium. High levels of rent-seeking effort can “crowd out” other, more 
productive efforts.  One mechanism for stemming such behavior is for a government to commit 
to “high quality” policies that effectively preclude its giving in to rent-seeking parties (Rafael La 
Porta et al. 1999). While central, peer-reviewed agencies would likely be considered a form of 
commitment, lobbying for earmarks might be characterized as rent-seeking, and thus crowding 
out other productive efforts of government.  
Within the broad literature on the structure of government, the paper addresses the 
congressional committee structure of government, and how it relates to federal discretionary 
spending.  In this literature, there are conflicting views as to whether representation on a 
committee results in that committee spending more of the committee budget in committee-
members’ districts than in non-committee members’ districts.
4  No study, however, has 
examined the effect information transmission through lobbying has on such discretionary 
spending.  Wright (1985) does show that PAC contributions are sometimes effective in obtaining 
favorable policy, only to the extent that the PAC is located in the member’s district.  Whether 
                                                 
3 Scholars have begun to study research outcomes associated with peer reviewed vs. earmarked projects (A. Abagail 
Payne 2001; Payne and Aloysius Siow 2002). 
4 Those finding committee effect on spending include Richard L. Hall et al (1990) and Charles R. Plott (1969).  
Those finding no effect include Kenneth R. Mayer (1991) and Bruce A. Ray (1980).  Those having mixed results 
include J. Theodore Anagnoson (1980) and R. Douglas Arnold (1981). 
  3location matters in lobbying, and how lobbying might affect the results in the committee 
structure-discretionary spending debate, remain open questions. 
We speak to three main issues in this paper:  educational earmarks, the returns to 
lobbying, and lobbying’s relationship to the performance of government and committees.  We 
begin by estimating the determinants of educational earmarks.  We assess the importance of 
political factors, district demographic factors, and institutional factors in determining the size of 
earmarks that post-secondary educational institutions obtain.  We include lobbying expenditures 
by universities on the right hand side, and assess the impact of lobbying on earmarks, using a 
number of different specifications, including instrumental variables.  We also revisit the federal 
appropriations process as it relates to educational earmarks, and explore the extent to which 1) 
spending is targeted toward committee member districts, and 2) lobbying influences the amount 
of money targeted toward institutions in the district.  In doing so, we extend Wright (1985) to 
include lobbying. 
We generate three main results.  First, the size of academic earmarks is heavily 
influenced by certain institutional characteristics, such as school ranking, or the presence of 
Ph.D. degree-conferring departments or a medical school.  We find evidence that, on average, 
top research institutions are less likely than lower-ranked institutions to receive earmark funding.  
This is consistent with claims that such institutions prefer to seek funding through the 
competitive grant system rather than the political system.   
Second, political factors also heavily influence the size of earmarks.  House and Senate 
Appropriations Committee members send a disproportionate share of the academic earmarks to 
their constituent universities, on the order of $105,000 to $130,000 for the Senate, and $80,000 
to $145,000 by the House.  Contrary to those who claim there is no relationship between federal 
spending and committee membership, our study provides evidence to support the claim that 
committee members do direct federal spending toward their districts.   
Finally, and most importantly, there is a complex relationship between lobbying and 
earmarks, with respect to Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) and House Appropriations 
Committee (HAC) membership. In particular, the average returns to lobbying for an average 
university are not statistically different from zero, when the institution is not represented by a 
member of the SAC or HAC.  But the returns to lobbying are very large when the institution is 
located in the state (district) of a Senate (House) Appropriations Committee member.  We 
  4calculate the average returns to a dollar spent on lobbying for the average lobbying university 
when there is representation on the SAC to range from $11 to $68, with almost all econometric 
specifications yielding an estimate of the return from $11 to $17.  With representation on the 
HAC, the average lobbying university obtains an average return of $14 to $77 from a dollar 
investment, with the baseline econometric estimates estimating a return of $20 to $36.  Thus, the 
returns to lobbying without SAC or HAC representation are near zero, but the average returns to 
lobbying with SAC or HAC representation are indeed very large.  Moreover, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that, on the margin, lobbying universities with SAC or HAC representation are 
setting marginal benefit to marginal cost.  Nevertheless, the vast majority of universities with 
representation do not lobby, and thus are not obtaining the full benefit to having representation 
on the HAC or SAC. 
This in turn indicates that lobbying is only effective to the extent that the legislator 
representing the university is in a position to deliver an earmark, consistent with Wright’s 
argument that location of political influence is important.  SAC and HAC legislators are less 
likely to send educational earmarks to districts they don’t represent.  In this respect, HAC and 
SAC members can be considered joint inputs into the earmarks production function. In addition, 
the results are consistent with vote-seeking legislators doing their best to send money to their 
districts, but relying upon their constituents to provide information to help them augment and 
target that amount.  Thus, we add to the discretionary spending debate by demonstrating that by 
omitting lobbying from the calculus, scholars are omitting a potentially large factor driving the 
discretionary spending behavior of legislators and committees. Finally, this also conforms to the 
La Porta et al (1998) viewpoint of low commitment by legislators to the peer-review process, 
giving certain interest-groups rent-seeking market power based on representation on certain 
powerful committees. 
  We structure the paper as follows.  In the next section we offer some background on 
educational earmarks and lobbying.  In Section II we then discuss the empirical challenges in 
measuring the returns to lobbying.  In this section we discuss in depth the measurement of 
lobbying and earmarks.  Section III lays out the data and model.  We provide the main results in 
Section IV.  In Section V, we discuss specification issues and possible alternative hypotheses for 
the relationship between lobbying and earmarks, including how alumni networks affect the 
results.  We conclude in Section VI. 
  5 
I.  BACKGROUND ON EDUCATIONAL EARMARKS AND LOBBYING 
As Goldin and Katz (1999) note, American institutions of higher education emphasized 
learning rather than research until late in the 19
th century.  However, as the scientific needs of 
industry increased, so did the demand for academic research in applied sciences.  Thus the 
modern research-oriented university became widely established by World War I, with research 
funded primarily by states and secondarily by local industry (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994).  
Although the federal government funded roughly 25 percent of academic research by the 1920s, 
this was largely in the form of agricultural research grants. These grants were awarded to land-
grant universities according to a formula that correlated the size of the grant to a state’s 
agricultural output, rather than to the potential value of specific research proposals (Savage 
1999).  
The exigencies of war led to a sea change in the mechanisms for federal funding of 
academic research.  As part of the war effort, the newly-formed Office of Scientific Research 
and Development contracted with private sector organizations for wartime-related research. This 
civilian agency, directed by Vanevar Bush, relied on scientists from academe and industry “to 
recommend and to guide as well as to participate in scientific research with military payoffs” 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1989: 124).  Largely due to the advocacy of Vanevar Bush, the practice 
of awarding federal research funds to individual scientists via competitive project-based grants 
became institutionalized by 1950.  Under this system, the awarding of funds was managed by the 
newly-created National Science Foundation and several other federal agencies, and awards were 
made primarily on the basis of peer review of project proposals.  
By 2001, federal funding of academic research through competitive grants exceeded $15 
billion.  Numerous scholars of technology policy have argued that this system has ensured that 
money is allocated toward the most promising research projects, and thus underpins the enduring 
success of academic research in the United States (e.g., Nelson and Rosenberg 1993).  
Yet the competitive grant process has had its share of critics as well.  A number of 
prominent academicians and legislators have argued that peer review serves to concentrate 
research funding in a few elite schools whose scientists populate the peer review boards (William 
H. Gray 1994, John Silber 1987).  Further, these critics have argued that peer review tends to 
reward “safe” research projects that conform to accepted beliefs, thus starving truly breakthrough 
  6research (Silber 1987).  According to this view, the earmarking of federal funds through the 
legislative process offers a potential counterbalance to the perceived defects of the competitive 
grant process. 
The birth of academic earmarks can be traced to the late 1970s, when Jean Meyer, 
President of Tufts University, engaged two lobbyists – Kenneth Schlossberg and Gerald Cassidy 
– to help secure funding for a nutrition and aging center. In addition to demonstrating to other 
universities that such funding could be obtained, this deal apparently gave Schlossberg and 
Cassidy the entrepreneurial idea of systematizing the business of securing academic earmarks.  
Over the next two decades Schlossberg and Cassidy, as well as several imitators, actively 
pursued educational institutions as clients, holding out the promise of obtaining academic 
earmarks (Savage 1999).  The amount of money allocated through academic earmarks rose from 
less than $17 million in 1980 (or $32 million if measured in constant 2001 dollars) to nearly $1.7 
billion in 2001, a 100-fold increase in nominal terms (and a 52-fold increase in real terms). By 
2001 academic earmarks represented nearly 10 percent of total federal funding of academic 
research (see Figures 1a and 1b). 
 
***********INSERT FIGURE 1a and 1b ABOUT HERE ********** 
 
The rise of specialist lobbying firms to secure earmarks also routinized the earmark 
“production schedule.”  The “life cycle” of lobbying and obtaining an earmark is as follows.
5  In 
January, a university’s administrators meet with its lobbyist to formulate their requests and 
lobbying strategy for the upcoming fiscal year earmarks.  This entails prioritizing potential 
requests by the likelihood of success, and identifying elected officials to lobby.  In most cases, 
the lobbyist will approach the Representative and/or Senator from the university’s district.  
Beginning in March and April, the university begins lobbying the targeted representatives to 
have its request included in the appropriations legislation.  After the August recess, there is a 
large push to have the request included in one of the thirteen appropriations bills.  The cycle 
ends, usually in November or early December, as the appropriations bills are sent to the 
President.  According to our interviewees, requests from one year do not carry forward to the 
                                                 
5 According to interviews with staffers on the appropriations committees and lobbyists. 
  7next year and the process starts again.  This is mainly because the appropriations process, unlike 
the budget process, is not a multiyear process.  
 
II.  CHALLENGES IN MEASURING THE RETURNS TO LOBBYING 
As noted in the introduction, estimating the returns to lobbying poses a number of 
challenges.  First, it is difficult to measure the monetary value of lobbying expenditures.  Until 
recently, systematic data on lobbying expenditures has not existed.  Consequently, nearly every 
published statistical study has relied on proxy measures, survey data, or dummy variable 
measures for lobbying, rather than direct measures of lobbying expenditures.
6  
Recent legislation passed by Congress has created lobbying expenditure disclosure 
requirements for universities (and all interest groups) and thus allows us to overcome this 
measurement problem. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 mandates that any individual who 
spends more than 20 percent of his or her time lobbying administrative agencies, Congress, or 
the Executive, must file a report disclosing the amount of money expended on this activity.  Each 
organization that lobbies Congress or an administrative agency, and spends more than $20,000 
doing so, also must file a report with the Clerk of the House disclosing the name of the lobbyist, 
the clients of the lobbyist, and the amount of money spent on lobbying by the client (to the 
nearest $20,000).
7  One complication that arises, however, is that firms and interest groups 
typically lobby across a range of issues (and multiple organizations lobby on the same issue). 
Even when a firm’s aggregate lobbying expenditure is known, it is difficult to identify how this 
expenditure is allocated across different issues. 
We overcome this by examining academic earmark funding.  Nearly all of university 
lobbying is directed at two objectives:  “earmark funding” and “science and research policy,” 
and the vast majority is directed at the former objective.
8  The first legislative item for which top 
and lower tier universities lobby is “earmark funding” (discussed further below). A small number 
of universities and umbrella groups also lobby for “science policy” -- to increase the amount of 
competitive grant funding that congress allocates to research in the form of budgets for the 
                                                 
6 Common proxies are PAC contributions, presence of a Washington office, 0-1 variable on “did you lobby on this 
issue” from survey instruments or archival research, and the presence of trade associations or trade unions.   
7 The lobbyist must include in this report all expenses related to the lobbying, including the costs of lobbying 
contacts and efforts in support of such contacts, including background work that is intended for use in contacts and 
coordination with the lobbying activities of others (Office of the Clerk of the House, 2001).  This includes salaries 
and benefits costs, overhead, expenses, and third-party billings. 
  8National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and agencies such 
as the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD). The organizations 
that lobby for “research policy” include the top 50-100 research universities in the U.S., and 
associations such as the American Association of Universities (AAU) and the Science Coalition. 
The remaining 6,400 post-secondary institutions generally do not.  (This fact will become 
important when we consider how to control for universities that lobby for “science policy.”)   
Since the vast majority of universities’ lobbying expenditures (and virtually 100 percent 
of lobbying expenditures by universities that are not among the top 50-100 research institutions) 
is devoted to the pursuit of earmarks, concerns about allocating lobbying expenditures across 
multiple policy objectives are ameliorated.  Thus, we use the dollar amount of lobbying 
expenditure as the key independent variable in our analysis below.  In econometric specification 
tests, we allow for different measures of lobbying. 
Second, it is difficult to measure the monetary value of policy outcomes that have been 
influenced by lobbying.  Many policies that governments legislate – such as saving the forests, 
mitigating lawsuits, creating a new regulation, and eliminating a disclosure rule – lack 
identifiable pecuniary returns. Even those government programs that do have discrete, 
measurable dollar benefits often distribute these benefits among many groups (such as 
telecommunications legislation). This makes the precise allocation of benefits to individual 
groups or companies difficult. Coupled with the difficulty in identifying and measuring the dollar 
value of lobbying expenditures, this challenge has made it nearly impossible to measure the 
economic returns to lobbying efforts.  
We overcome this challenge by studying an easily measurable benefit.  Earmark grants 
specify the university that is to receive funding, the amount of the funding, and the purpose of 
the funding.
9  These earmarks are non-competitive grants given to universities, colleges, and 
community colleges, for specific research and other projects attributable to the post-secondary 
institution (Amy Finkelstein 1995).  These projects range from research on corn, to the 
development of underwater propulsion mechanisms, to the study of Irish management 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 We have conducted interviews with lobbyists and they confirm this viewpoint. 
9 For example, “$10,000,000 for the construction and equipping a new space dynamics lab Utah State 
University….”; 
“$10,000,000 for NASA to establish an independent verification and validation center in conjunction with West 
Virginia University” (Savage 1999: 8) 
 
  9techniques.  The dollar value of these earmarks is identifiable, measurable, and easily allocated 
to a specific institution, consequently overcoming the measurement challenges noted above.  
Thus, we use the dollar amount of these earmarks as the dependent variable in our analysis 
below.  
A third challenge for scholars of lobbying is to disentangle lobbying’s impact from that 
of other instruments of political influence.  There are a myriad of ways in which interest groups 
and firms influence legislation.  The three most prominent are a) PAC contributions; b) lobbying; 
and c) grassroots organizing.  It would be incorrect to attribute policy outcomes to only one of 
the factors when all three are being used or are available. More challenging, interest groups 
should be simultaneously optimizing across all three tools at their disposal.  Thus, when the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) wants to influence the passage of certain labor legislation, it 
should consider how to optimally allocate its resources among campaign contributions, 
membership mobilization, and direct lobbying, to create the most favorable outcome.  In 
statistical studies of lobbying, therefore, one cannot simply include PAC contributions and 
grassroots organization as variables on the right-hand side of the equation, but rather must 
employ instruments that are correlated with PAC contributions and uncorrelated with lobbying, 
and correlated with grassroots organizing and uncorrelated with lobbying.  These are not trivial 
instruments to derive and measure in a large sample statistical study. 
A study of university lobbying directly addresses this challenge.  As non-profit 
institutions, universities are not permitted to create and fund political action committees, and 
thus give no money in PAC contributions or “soft money” to political candidates or political 
parties.
10  In addition, universities are not allowed to engage in grassroots organization of its 
members for political purposes.  Lobbying is clearly the dominant, and in most cases the only, 
avenue for universities pursuing earmarks. 
A fourth and final challenge in measuring the returns to lobbying relates to variance in 
the quality of the groups lobbying.  Let us suppose, for example, that IBM lobbies for legislation 
regarding disk drive construction.  Winchester and Seagate also lobby, but for a different 
legislative outcome.  IBM’s preferred policy is passed by Congress.  It is not clear to the 
researcher whether this results from IBM’s lobbying effort, or from its superior technology in 
  10disk drives.  If one is to measure the returns to lobbying, then one must be able to control for the 
optimality of the policy, relative to the alternatives.  This is quite difficult to do, because it is 
difficult to determine if IBM is the best disk-drive maker, and it is likely even more difficult to 
determine a ranking of all disk drive makers in the industry for a statistical analysis.  The 
compounded challenges become even more onerous if one considers other policies such as 
saving dolphins, reforming campaign finance, or drilling in the Arctic, where a measuring of 
social welfare or ranking of groups is required as well. 
This challenge is easily surmounted in a study of universities.  Using ranking data by 
independent sources, such as the National Academy of Science, we can control for quality of 
university by department.   
 
III.  DATA AND MODEL 
 
A. DATA 
The dependent variable is the amount of money Congress earmarks to a given academic 
institution.
11  A full description of all the variables can be found in the Appendix.   
The primary independent variable of interest is the amount of money an academic 
institution of higher learning spends on lobbying.  We have obtained the 1997-1999 data from 
disclosures made by institutions in compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as 
described in the previous section.
12  
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Universities could form non-affiliated PACs.  For example, there could arise a Harvard PAC, but this PAC would 
be independent from the university, and the university would not be permitted to fund the traditional 40 percent 
overhead these PACs have.  However, this is extremely rare. 
11 Some earmarks are shared amongst more than one university.  In almost every case, we have been able to identify 
the universities that share the earmark, and have allocated the earmark funding to the universities in an equal 
proportion.  For those handful of shared earmarks for which we cannot identify all the institutions which share, we 
have assumed that there are 2.5 institutions sharing the earmark and have allocated 2/5 of the shared earmark to the 
institution.  
12 One concern about the data is that the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires interest groups to file the amount 
of all of their lobbying of the federal government.  This includes both administrative agency and congressional 
lobbying.  However, this study is only concerned with congressional lobbying.  If an institution engages in a 
substantial amount of administrative agency lobbying, then there would be an error in variables problem.  To 
address this problem we conducted a number of interviews with university lobbyists at 20 institutions of various 
geography and rankings, to discuss their institution’s lobbying patterns.  All noted that the focus on their lobbying 
efforts is on Congress.  Two elite institutions did note that some of their lobbying is at the administrative agency 
level over disclosure and safety rules, but they characterized this as small in magnitude and significance relative to 
their congressional lobbying efforts.  To a good first approximation, the lobbying data does reflect congressional 
lobbying.  In addition, we pursue econometric solutions to this potential problem in the next section. 
  11The third set of data employed is a set of characteristics for each congressperson and 
senator in each year from 1997 to 1999.  We include the Representative’s ADA score, the two 
Senators’ mean ADA score, dummy variables for appropriations committee assignments, dummy 
variables for chairmen and ranking members, and dummy variables if the Senator or 
Representative has previously held a job as an educator.  We also match the legislators with their 
alma maters, to test for any effect on the outcomes of earmarking.  This set of data controls for 
congressional influence over the earmarking process. 
A fourth set of data comes from the Bureau of the Census.  The Census Bureau maps the 
results of the Census into congressional districts.  In employing this data, we study whether 
Congress targets earmark grants to universities in districts with specific characteristics.  We 
include data on population density, age, education, employment, and income of individuals in the 
district. 
To control for university quality, we employ the National Academy of Science (NAS) 
university rankings.  Every 10 years, the NAS ranks 41 different departments at all research 
universities on their research quality.  Each department is given a score on a 1 to 5 scale (with 
decimals), and then is given an ordinal ranking relative to all other schools.  
Finally, we employ a database of other university characteristics.  This database is 
popularly called the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, or IPEDS database.  Each 
year, the Department of Education certifies post-secondary institutions that are eligible for Title 
IV (or financial aid) funds. Students who attend certified institutions can apply to the federal 
government to receive Pell grants, Stafford Loans, and other forms of federally subsidized 
financial aid.  We mapped these institutions into congressional districts by nine-digit zip code to 
create a concordance with the congressional data.  The main variables we use here to control for 
institution characteristics are whether the institution is private, has a medical school, has a Ph.D. 
program, or has athletic aid scholarships.  We also control for student enrollment.  We also use 
the IPEDS data and zip code data to determine the number of institutions in the state and the 
congressional district.   
One challenge in this study is determining which institutions to include in the sample 
frame.  An examination of the data reveals that there are over 6,453 post-secondary institutions 
in the 50 states
13 that are certified by the Department of Education, and whose students are 
                                                 
13 Only institutions in the 50 states have been included in this study.  
  12eligible to receive financial aid.  These range from prestigious research institutions such as 
Harvard University, to one-year certification programs such as AAA School of Hair Styling.   
Although these could all be considered “credible” institutions of post-secondary training,
14 not 
all such institutions may be in the “risk set” to receive earmarks.  To further cull the dataset, we 
eliminated all institutions that are not ranked by the Carnegie Foundation as institutions of higher 
education.  We eliminate another 49 institutions because of incomplete data.  Finally, we 
eliminate all for-profit schools (because they are not in danger of losing their tax exempt status if 
they engage in other forms of political activity).  This leaves us with 2,382 institutions under 
scrutiny.  In later sections of this paper, we consider the possibility of further restricting the 
sample. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.  We bifurcate the table into all universities all 
years (n=7,146), and only those that lobby (n=423).
15  The average annual earmark amount for 
all institutions is $230,290 with a maximum of $44.5 million for Loma Linda University.  
Annual lobbying expenditures for this group have averaged $7,442, ranging from no lobbying to 
$760,000 by Boston University. For the sub-sample that lobby, the average earmark is $1.92 
million and the average lobbying expenditure $125,726.  It is the fact that earmark grants are 15-
35 times lobbying expenditures that have led many casual commentators to note that interest 
groups receive so much for their minor lobbying efforts.   
 
***********INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ********** 
 
 
B.  LOBBYING AND EARMARKS   
We begin by exploring the relationship between committee structure, lobbying and 
earmarks.  Figure 2a presents a graph of earmarks on lobbying for all years, all institutions, with 
                                                 
14 The Department of Education frequently revokes the status of institutions usually in response to high default rates 
on student loans. 
15 There are four institutions where the governing board lobbies.  For example, the California Community College 
System lobbies the federal government.  We allocated this lobbying effort into each school with an IPEDS number 
in the California Community College System evenly, and by enrollment.  In no case, however, did the allocation 
exceed a $3,000 per school.  Because the cut-off in observable lobbying for all other schools is $20,000, we coded 
these a zeroes.  Note, if we eliminate schools in these four systems from our sample, it does not change our results.  
If we include the allocated amounts, the results presented in this paper are slightly smaller in magnitude, but with 
greater statistical significance. 
  13the state in which the institution is located indicated.  A review of the figure shows that both 
earmarks and lobbying and distributed across a range, with a large concentration at smaller 
amounts.  There is no obvious systematic pattern in the data. 
In Figure 2b, we replace each state indicator with a legislator indicator.  If the institution 
is represented by a House Appropriations Committee member, the point receives an H; a Senate 
Appropriations Committee member, an S; both a House and Senate Appropriations Committee 
member, an HS; and no appropriations committee members, an O.  A pattern now begins to 
emerge.  Those institutions that are high are the earmark-scale tend to have Senate and/or House 
appropriations committee membership.  Those institutions that are low on the earmark scale 
(even if high on the lobbying scale) tend to be more highly represented by no appropriations 
committees members.  This is suggestive of the importance of appropriations committee 
representation. 
 
***********INSERT FIGURES2a and 2b ABOUT HERE ********** 
 
Table 2 shows the average levels of lobbying and average size of earmark per university 
in the 1997-1999 time period by appropriations committee membership.  The table shows the 
statistics for all universities, and also for the “lobbier” (lobbying expenditures > 0) sub-sample.  
In the full sample, the results show that the average university with no representation on the SAC 
spent $9,430 lobbying, and received an earmark of $144,693.  The unconditional average return 
was over $15 for every $1 spent on lobbying.  However, universities with representation on the 
SAC lobbied about 40 percent less than their non-represented counterparts, yet received just over 
two times the earmark, for an unconditional return on investment of almost $56 for every $1 
spent on lobbying.  A similar pattern can be found in the House.  The return for universities 
without representation on the HAC is just over $25 for every dollar spent in lobbying.  Their 
counterparts who happen to be in districts where the representative is on the Appropriations 
Committee, lobby almost the same, on average, and receive an earmark of almost $320,000 
more, for a return of $66 for each dollars in earmark for every dollar spent on lobbying.   
 
***********INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ********** 
 
  14When we limit our analysis to institutions that actually lobby, the relative results are 
roughly the same.  A lobbying university with SAC representation receives on average, three 
times the return of a university that is not presented by a SAC member.  In the lower chamber, 
lobbiers with HAC representation also receive three times the amount of earmarks, on average, 
than lobbying universities without HAC representation.  This evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that committee membership is crucial in determining who receives federal 
educational earmarks.  Moreover, it does suggest that universities do alter their lobbying and 
expectations for federal outlays in a statistically significant way, based on the representation they 
have in Congress. 
While the static unconditional means provide the first chapter of an interesting story, we 
have a short time series in the data (1997-1999), that might also help to add insight.  There are 
very few individuals who switch on or off of the appropriations committees during this time 
period.  All of the switching occurs after the 1998 election.  In Table 2 we illustrate two of the 
switchers.  Senator Faircloth (R-NC) is defeated in 1998 by Senator John Edwards (D-NC), and 
thus loses his position on the SAC.  He is not replaced by Edwards or by Jesse Helms (R-NC), so 
North Carolina loses its representation on the SAC.  One can see the impact of such a switch in 
the first two columns of Table 3.  There is large jump in lobbying by North Carolina universities 
between 1998 and 1999, but the earmarks to North Carolina are cut in half in 1999.  A 
contrasting example is the retirement of Dale Bumpers (D-AR) who served on the SAC until his 
retirement in 1998.  As in the case of North Carolina, Arkansas actually witnessed an increase in 
lobbying after Bumpers stepped down from the SAC, but also saw an increase in earmarks.
16 
 
***********INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ********** 
 
Arizona provides information on the opposite effect.  Jon Kyl is (R-AZ), is elected in 
1994 and is elevated to the SAC in 1999, giving Arizona new representation on the Committee 
as the Committee’s most junior member from the majority party.  Though average lobbying stays 
level during between 1998 and 1999, educational earmarks for the average university in Arizona 
increase by 41 percent.  Likewise, Senator Durbin (D-IL) is elevated to the SAC in 1999 
(replacing Bumpers).  This results in an increase in lobbying and an increase in earmarks.  Thus, 
                                                 
16 This may be partially a President Clinton effect, as the President nears the end of his second term. 
  15in three of the four cases of committee switchers, we see the both lobbying and earmarks 
responding to changes in SAC membership. 
While this section provides evidence that examining the unconditional means supports 
the committee power story, and that universities change their lobbying in response to 
representation in Congress on the appropriations committees, it is difficult to determine a causal 
relationship from this data alone.  In order to do this, we conduct a statistical analysis.   
 
C. METHOD 
We begin by assuming a diminishing marginal return to lobbying.  How lobbying enters 
into the equation, however is not certain, so we consider (Lobbying)
γ , where γ  is the power 
function that determines the concavity of the function and the rate of diminishing marginal 
returns to lobbying.
17  Thus, we wish to estimate the following equation: 
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where Earmark$ is the dollar value of the earmark university i, received in year t, (Lobbying)
γ  is 
the lobbying expenditure of institution i in time t raised to the power γ  which is a factor of the 
degree of diminishing marginal returns, HAC and SAC are dummy variables for representation 
on the HAC and SAC,  is a matrix of time-varying institutional-specific factors, and   is a 
set of time-invariant institutional factors.  We include interactive variables of lobbying with the 
two appropriations committees as well.   
it Χ i Ω
  To account for the committee structure hypothesis, we include direct effects of HAC and 
SAC, in the way they are traditionally included in the model.  If House and Senate members are 
responsive to the needs of their own districts and tend to send money to their own districts, then 
the  2 β  and  3 β  parameters will pick up the magnitude of this effect. 
                                                 
17 We begin by considering a function of linear relationship between earmarks and the log of lobbying expenditures 
as the base case, and consider other functional forms in later models.  A trans-log or polynomial model might be a 
natural candidate specification.  However, given that we have interactive variables that are endogenous, severe 
multicollinearity problem arises in attempting to instrument for many higher power endogenous interactive terms. 
  16We also include the interactive effect to see if members in positions of power are more 
responsive to lobbying than those who are not.  That is, controlling for committee assignments, 
leadership, and district composition, does lobbying a powerful legislator who represents you 
result in any additional benefit to lobbying.  We rely on  4 β  and  5 β  to measure the effect.  A 
positive coefficient would suggest a larger return to lobbying to universities that are located in 
key districts.
18   
In order to find γ  we conduct a grid search, allowing γ  to vary on the interval [0, 1] (no 
effect to constant returns), and minimize the sum of squared errors (SSR).  We find a minimum 
of the sum of squared errors at γ  = 0.23.  This is nearly equal to the log transformation of 
lobbying. We cannot reject that the log transformation and the γ  = .23 transformation yield the 
same results.  Because of the intuitive and attractive properties of the log transformation, we 
present the baseline econometric results using Ln(Lobbying).
19  In later specifications in Table 6, 
we consider γ  = .23 and censored regression models.  All standard errors are robust in the single 
panels, and clustered on institutions in the multiple time period panels. 
One concern with the specification above is that the coefficient estimates might be 
biased.  This may occur because the set of schools that lobby may not be a random selection of 
institutions.  Thus, we would have an unobservable factor that is correlated with both the 
outcome and the error term.  Hence, we consider instrumental variables to solve this problem.  
We look for a variable that is correlated with the independent variable but uncorrelated with the 
error term.  We have four candidate variables that might meet this criterion, two of which are 
used in the baseline estimations.   
The first instrument used in the baseline models is the overhead rate for the university.  
All federal research grants to universities have indirect costs (commonly known as overhead) 
which are attached to the grant.  Overhead rates, negotiated with government contracting 
authorities, are designed to pay for operating costs and infrastructure of the university for 
research.  Two characteristics of this variable make it an attractive instrument.  First, because 
overhead is usually attached to earmarks, the higher the overhead rates, the higher the incentive 
of an organization to seek an earmark.  Second, the higher the overhead rate, the more money the 
                                                 
18 The instrument that is omitted from each equation for these interactive variables is the interaction of the chosen 
instrument with HAC and SAC.   
  17university has to engage in lobbying activities, and the more likely it is to engage in lobbying.  
Indeed, in the political realm, it is has been shown that companies tend to give more PAC 
contributions to politicians the higher are their profits and sales (Kevin B. Grier et al. 1994).  We 
use a similar logic here with lobbying.  The instrument is likely to be positively correlated with 
lobbying, yet it is unlikely to be directly correlated with earmarks, because the politicians are 
unlikely to know the overhead rates for each post-secondary institution in the district.  
We obtained the overhead rates from the Division of Cost Allocation of the Office of 
Grants Management of the Department of Health of Human Services (HHS).
20  Universities 
usually sign global agreements to cover research funded by the federal government for a 
specified overhead rate for a given year.  While 90 percent of the contracts are signed with HHS, 
about 10 percent of contracts are signed with the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department 
of Education (DOEd).  HHS collects all of these contracts in the only comprehensive, centralized 
database of overhead rates of which we are aware.  We obtained the contracts from HHS and 
have taken the relevant overhead rate in April of the year of interest.
21  Table 1 shows that 
overhead rates range from 8 percent to 85 percent, with 22 percent as a mean.  The first stage 
regression of lobbying on the RHS variables and overhead rate indicates that a 10-point rise in 
overhead rates results in between a 2 percent to 10 percent rise in lobbying expenditure at the 90 
percent to 99 percent level of statistical significance, depending upon the precise first stage 
specification.   
The second potential instrument is lag of Ln(Lobbying).
22  Lobbying is a sticky cost that 
universities incur from one year to the next.  There is also high positive correlation between lag 
of lobbying and lobbying.  An important criterion, however, is that lobbying in the previous 
period not be correlated with earmarks in this period. To explore whether this is a reasonable 
assumption, we interviewed congressional staffers. As noted above in Section I, lobbying during 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 We add one to the value of lobbying so that the RHS variable will not reach negative infinity.  In Model 7, we 
relax this transformation of the RHS and use γ  = .23, where zeroes are recorded for zero levels of lobbying. 
20 Special thanks to Charles Seed and Otto Kent for assistance with the data. 
21 Most overhead rate contracts go from summer to summer, though a few are on a calendar year schedule, and are 
generally sticky from year to year.  In most cases, we use the on-campus research rate for the main campus.  For 
universities that did not have this rate, we used the closest category available. 
22 Although one might be concerned about the “quality of projects” being funded, writers have noted that academic 
earmarks are really just a form of discretionary spending and transfers (Savage 1997), independent of project 
quality.  If universities move along with some steady pattern of lobbying, and then in one particular year, have a 
good project for an earmark, their lobbying may suddenly shoot up.   We would like to have instrument to control 
  18one year has no effect on appropriations decisions the following year, per se.  We find further 
evidence in Savage (1999: 109), who cites the marketing material of one of the top earmark 
lobbyists that the cycle for obtaining an earmark is 1-2 years.  To the extent that the 
appropriations process is characterized by a “memory-less” annual cycle, it is unlikely that 
lobbying in one period has an effect on the appropriations in the current period.  A doubling of 
lobbying in the previous period results in an 86 percent increase in lobbying in this period at the 
99 percent level of statistical significance.  Though there is a potential theoretical argument to 
use this instrument, a Hausman specification test for overidentification indicates we should 
include this second instrument at the 99 percent level of confidence.  Nevertheless, in Table 6 as 
an extension to the baseline results, we remove this instrument and estimate the just-identified 
model with only overhead rates. 
We considered two additional instruments, but their disadvantages led us to exclude them 
from the analysis.  The first is a free cash measure.  For a sub-sample of the universities, we have 
information on their total revenue and total expenditures.  We could use the log of the difference 
as a measure of free cash.  The more free cash the university has, the more likely it is to engage 
in lobbying for favors.  The logic is the same as that for overhead rates.  We opted not to use this 
because the coverage is not as good as overhead rates, and the effect is likely to be the same.  
The second additional instrument is endowment levels and returns.  Unfortunately, this 
instrument has a number of problems.  Only some universities have endowments.  This is not 
necessarily a problem; however, finding comparable and comprehensive data is difficult. As with 
the free cash flow measure, the endowment data collected by the Department of Education 
IPEDs survey is present for less than 1/3 of the sample.  Moreover, in both cases, a Hausman 
specification test allows us to reject the hypothesis that there is systematic variation in the 
coefficients using these instruments.   
 
IV.  RESULTS 
  In Table 4 we present our initial results.  Model 1 presents the simple OLS model using 
the general framework proposed by most scholars.
23  We include a direct effect for lobbying and 
                                                                                                                                                             
for the “quality of idea”, and the lag of lobbying serves as that kind of instrument, because it is correlated with the 
baseline quality of ideas being generated from the institution. 
23 This includes examining the effectiveness of lobbying as a direct effect, without considering the nature of joint 
inputs with the legislator or the recipient of the information. 
  19a direct effect for SAC and HAC membership, and no interactive effects.  In this model, we see 
the effect posited by some scholars of federal spending—that committee members direct 
spending to their home districts and states.  SAC members earmark $178,184 more per university 
to their states than do members who do not hold these seats.  HAC members earmark $287,390 
more per university to their districts than do members who do not hold those seats.  These 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 99 percent level of significance.  Thus, we see that 
in the case of educational earmarks, committee membership is associated with larger 
discretionary spending being targeted to the district in this specification.  The direct effect of 
lobbying is also substantial in this traditional model. For a university that spends the average 
amount on lobbying ($7,450), the average return to lobbying is $100.96 for every dollar spent, 
after controlling for congressional representation, district characteristics, university quality, and 
university characteristics.  For the average lobbying university ($125,726), the return is $7.88.  
This, too, is statistically significant at the 99 percent level.  The magnitude of the coefficient and 
its statistical significance confirms the general belief that there are enormous returns to lobbying 
for everyone given the investments made.  However, this is unlikely to be the correct model. 
 
***********INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ********** 
 
  In Model 2, we test what we believe to be a more accurate model of lobbying. This 
estimation indicates that the high returns to lobbying are confined to those who are fortunate 
enough to be located in the districts of powerful congressmen, and lobby those powerful 
legislators.  In Model 2, we include the interactive variables (Lobbying*House Appropriations 
Comm and Lobbying * Senate Appropriations Comm).  The inclusion of these two omitted 
variables changes the estimated effectiveness of lobbying.  Although the coefficients on the 
direct SAC and HAC variables are still measured with statistical significance of 99 percent, their 
impact is cut by 40 percent.  That is, the direct returns to having a SAC or HAC member are now 
$106,509 and $146,923 respectively, to the average university in the district.  The coefficient on 
lobbying plummets to less than 1/10 of its value in Model 1.  Allowing for its log formulation, 
lobbying efforts by the average university yields average returns of $7.74 for each dollar spent.  
If we consider the average lobbying university, the average return to its $125,726 investment in 
lobbying is $0.60 for every dollar spent.  More problematic for believers of the direct effect of 
  20lobbying, the coefficient is no longer measured with precision, and it is not statistically 
significant in this model or in any subsequent models.  We cannot reject the hypothesis that there 
is zero direct effect to lobbying. 
The interactive variables, however, have coefficients that are positive and statistically 
significant at the 95 percent and 90 percent level of significance.  Lobbying is much more 
effective if the lobbyist is located in the district of the key decision-makers.  Thus, in this model, 
controlling for all previously-mentioned effects, the average returns to lobbying for a university 
that spends the average amount on lobbying ($7,442) and is represented by a HAC member is 
$275.28; a university with average lobbying and representation on the SAC can expect $150.10 
on average for every dollar spent. If we evaluate, however, what SAC representation does for 
lobbying investment of the average lobbying university ($125,726), the return is $11.11 for SAC 
representation and $21.48 for HAC representation.  This result is consistent with the intersection 
of two hypotheses:  the location hypothesis and the informational hypothesis of lobbying.  Thus 
the returns to having a House or Senate member in the key position is composed of a direct effect 
unrelated to lobbying and an additional effect tied to the amount of lobbying undertaken.  
Model 2 indicates that average returns to lobbying for universities with HAC or SAC 
representation are extremely high, exceeding 1000 percent.  This raises the question: if the 
average returns to lobbying are so high, are universities “underinvesting” in lobbying? We 
address this question by examining the marginal returns to lobbying and determining whether 
universities are setting the marginal returns equal to the marginal costs.  We categorize the 
universities that lobby into three groups:  those with no representation, those with HAC but no 
SAC representation, and those with SAC but no HAC representation.  For each category, we 
identify the average lobbying expenditure by universities, and then calculate the return that the 
average lobbying university would obtain if it spent one additional dollar on lobbying.  We base 
this calculation on the coefficients from Model 2. Table 5 presents the results.   
 
  **********INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE *********** 
 
Table 5 shows that, conditional on lobbying, the average return to lobbying universities is 
$15.64 for universities with HAC representation and $11.79 for universities with SAC 
representation.
 At the same time, the marginal return for those with HAC representation is $1.29 
  21for every dollar spent, and the marginal return for those with SAC membership is $1.00 for every 
dollar spent.
24  We then conduct a statistical test to answer two questions:  can we reject the 
hypothesis that the marginal return to lobbying for every additional dollar spent is zero?  Can we 
reject the hypothesis that the marginal return to lobbying for every additional dollar spent is one?  
The final two columns of Table 5 answer these questions. For lobbying universities with HAC or 
SAC representation, we can reject the hypothesis that the marginal benefit is zero, but cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the marginal benefit is equal to one at the 95 percent level of 
confidence using a Wald test. Thus, for universities that enjoy either HAC or SAC 
representation, we cannot reject the hypothesis that universities are setting MB = MC.  The 
divergence of the marginal condition and the average condition also suggests that universities 
with representation face a steep benefit from lobbying, which flattens out quickly.  Table 5 also 
shows that, for lobbying universities without HAC or SAC representation, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the marginal return to lobbying is zero, and we can reject the hypothesis that the 
MB is equal to one.  While the vast majority of universities-year observations (93 percent, n = 
2,805) without HAC or SAC representation do not lobby, universities without representation that 
do lobby (7 percent, n = 219) may be engaging in excess lobbying when there is no HAC or SAC 
representation.  We can contrast this to those universities with representation on the HAC or 
SAC.  Here, we see the reverse effect.  About 5 percent (n = 172) of university-year observations 
that do have HAC or SAC representation do lobby and take advantage of their privileged 
representation in Congress while 95 percent (n = 3,353) do not.  On average, we estimate that 
approximately 45 percent of universities are lobbying optimally, 6 percent are engaged in 
excessive lobbying, and 49 percent of universities are lobbying less than is optimal.  One reason 
for systematic under-lobbying may be that there is not yet a consensus in the university 
community as to whether this is a “legitimate” form of government funding of university 
research. 
One concern about these marginal calculations is their robustness.  The marginal return 
calculation is sensitive to the functional form, which thus far has been specified as the log of 
lobbying.  However, we can return to our original formulation and examine over what range of 
diminishing marginal returns (γ ) we will still not reject the hypothesis that MC = MB = 1.  The 
                                                 
24 To calculate the marginal returns, we calculate the return to lobbying at the average level of lobbying.  Then we 
add one dollar to this amount and calculate the returns to lobbying for the average plus one dollar.  This amount is 
  22last column of the Table 5 shows the results.  We can reject that the coefficient is equal to zero, 
and cannot reject (with a Wald test at the 99 percent level) that the coefficient implies MC = MB 
= 1, for universities with HAC representation for the range γ  = [.01, .23], and for universities 
with SAC representation for the range γ  = [.02, 1.00].  Put differently, for reasonable ranges of 
diminishing marginal returns to lobbying, we cannot reject the hypothesis that universities are 
optimizing on the margin.  These results help to explain why we see such large returns to 
lobbying—namely that the universities are optimizing, in general, on the margin, but are 
obtaining a large return on average.  The popular press and many academics tend to focus on the 
average return, rather than the marginal return.   
The results of Model 2 show that a university that spends the average amount on 
lobbying ($125,726), and is average in all other respects, will obtain an earmark of $110,000 if it 
has no representation in either appropriations committees, $1,613,000 if it has representation on 
only the SAC, and $2,881,000 if it has representation on only the HAC.   
Model 3 presents the results using instrumental variables, namely the overhead rate and 
lagged lobbying expenditure.  As in the previous model, the coefficients on the lobbying 
variables with Senate and House interactions are statistically significant at the 95 percent and 90 
percent level, and the direct effect of lobbying is not statistically significant.  The coefficients of 
both interactive variables increases about 50 percent compared to Model 2. The direct effect of 
SAC maintains its economic and statistical significance, but the coefficient for the direct effect 
of HAC is almost half its magnitude compared to Model 2 and not statistically significant.   
In Model 4, we deal with the problem of institutional capabilities and idiosyncracies.  For 
example, universities could differ in their unobserved abilities to obtain earmark grants.  These 
might be related to the quality of internal lobbyists, alumni networks, and the charisma of the 
university chancellor or president.  To solve for this problem, we repeat the estimation procedure 
using university random effects in a random effects instrumental variables estimator.
25  This 
accounts for both the endogeneity of lobbying and for the unobserved institution-specific effects.  
The result is presented in Model 4.  The coefficient on the direct effect of lobbying is around six 
times larger than the previous two models, and is, again, not statistically significant.  The 
coefficients on both interactive variables (HAC*Lobbying and SAC*Lobbying) are about 
                                                                                                                                                             
the marginal benefit, and should be equal to one if the MC=MB. 
  23halfway between the values in the previous two models. Both coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 99 percent level of confidence.  Taken at the average level of lobbying for 
lobbying universities, having SAC representation results in is $13.61 larger returns to lobbying 
compared to those universities without SAC representation, while HAC representation results in 
$28.89 greater return to lobbying than those without HAC representation.  The direct effects of 
HAC and SAC are close to the previous model. Our test of marginal returns for Model 4 yields 
results that are similar to those presented in Table 5 for Model 2. 
  Only a handful of the control variables are measured with statistically significant 
coefficients.  Institutions with PhD programs receive $600,000 more in earmarks.  However, 
each top-ranked research department an institution has lowers the earmark by about $50,000.
26  
Together these suggest that earmarks are being directed to middle and lower-tier institutions with 
Ph.D. programs. Institutions with medical schools receive $1.4 - $1.8 million more in earmark 
funding than do universities without these higher education programs.  In some specifications, 
the political and district variables have a statistically significant impact on the size of earmarks.  
In Model 4, alumni on the HAC and SAC raise the value of an earmark by $321,000 and 
$617,000 respectively.  Finally, the earmark that a university receives increases with the number 
of universities in its district, with each additional university in the district increasing the earmark 
by $15,000 to $25,000.  
  Overall, the results suggest that there is a zero or small return to lobbying for earmarks in 
the absence of having a congressional representation on the HAC or SAC. In the presence of 
HAC or SAC representation, however, the returns to lobbying for the average lobbying 
university are $11-$17 and $20-$36, respectively. 
 
V.  SPECIFICATION AND ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
 
A. SPECIFICATION 
  A number of steps were taken to test the accuracy of the assumptions underlying the 
model as well as the robustness of the results to different specifications.  Using an F-test, we can, 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 One might also employ a fixed effects estimator to address this unobserved heterogeneity.  However, given the 
short panel (t=3), this is infeasible in the current study.  
26 This may be attributable to a conscious decision by these top schools not to pursue earmarks.  The problems this 
may cause, and corrections for this effect, are discussed in the next section.   
  24in all of the models, reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the model are jointly equal to 
zero at the 99 percent level of confidence.  In addition, we consider a number of possible other 
specifications using Model 4, the random effects instrumental variable specification, as the point 
of comparison. The results are presented in Table 6.  In all specifications presented in Table 6, 
the coefficient on the direct effect of lobbying is statistically insignificant, while the coefficients 
on both of the interactive effects are statistically significant, consistent with the results in Models 
3 and 4. 
 
*********INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE******** 
 
First, we consider how specific classes of universities may affect the results.  In Model 5, 
we take out all universities in California, Illinois, and Massachusetts, states with the outlier 
universities from Figure 2.  The coefficients on the interactive effect of lobbying with HAC 
drops by about 60 percent, but the interactive effect with SAC is almost the same as earlier 
models.  In both cases, the coefficients are statistically significant.  In Model 6, we take out the 
community colleges (as it is unlikely they are engaged in research) and examine only 4-year 
colleges and post-graduate institutions.  The coefficients on the interactive effects are almost the 
same as in Model 4, and are statistically significant. 
Second, we consider how changes in functional form might affect our results.  In Model 
7, we present the results for γ  = .23, which was the value of γ  that minimized the sum of squared 
residuals in the grid search.  Again, the coefficients are of the same magnitude as in Model 4.  
We can compare this result to a simple model of lobbying where γ  = 1 (linear in lobbying) in 
Model 8.  Here the average return to lobbying is -$1.40 without representation, and additional 
$14.15 with only HAC representation, and $11.88 with only SAC representation.  The direct 
effect of lobbying is not statistically significant, but the average returns to lobbying calculated in 
Model 8 with SAC representation are in the range of the baseline models, while the average 
return to HAC representation is about 25 percent less than the baseline models.  This suggests 
that results are robust to various degrees of diminishing marginal returns. 
  A third issue is instrumentation.  As noted before, a Hausman test does not reject the 
hypothesis of overidentification in instruments.  Nevertheless, one may be concerned about using 
a lagged dependent variable as an instrument, especially if one believes that lobbying is in fact a 
  25cumulative investment rather than an investment that depreciates after one year (a critique we 
deal with in the next section).  Therefore, in Model 9, we present the results for the just-
identified random effects instrumental variable model, with Ln(Lobbying)t-1 omitted as an 
additional instrument.  With the exclusion of this instrument in the first stage, we obtain 
coefficients that are roughly double the size of the coefficients in Model 4, and still statistically 
significant. 
  A final potential specification issue is that the dependent variable has a large number of 
zeroes, thus causing problems with the error distribution.  To address this concern, we use a 
Heckman selection model.  In this model, we assume that there is a latent variable, which is how 
close one is to obtaining an earmark.  The latent variable underlies the observed variable, and is 
continuous, even though we observe only zeroes.  Once an institution receives an earmark, 
however, the latent variable is observed.  Thus, there is a selection effect operating.  In Model 10 
we present the results for Heckman selection model, which selects on lobbying.
27  Here, again, 
the direct effect of lobbying is statistically insignificant, and the coefficients on the interactive 
effects are positive and statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence.  In Model 
10, the magnitude of the coefficients on the HAC and SAC interactive variables are about three 
times the effect estimated in Model 4. 
  In all, the six alternative specifications yield results that are consistent with those of 
Table 4, though in two of the specifications, the point estimates of the coefficients are somewhat 
larger than the base econometric estimates.  In all alternative specifications, the estimated 
interactive variable coefficients of interest are statistically significant, while the coefficients on 
the direct effects of lobbying are all statistically insignificant. 
 
B. ALTERNATIVE  HYPOTHESES 
Our first concern is measurement error.  As was noted earlier in the paper, top 
universities may create problems for the analysis in many ways.  First, some do not lobby for 
earmarks, but instead lobby for federal “science” budget of NIH, NSF, DOD, NASA, and DOE.  
Second, those that do lobby for earmarks may also be lobbying for science budgets.
28  Third, 
                                                 
27 We use all the exogenous variables in the second stage equations as first stage RHS variables plus the overhead 
rate variable. 
28 On these first two points, there are three potential sources of measurement error.  The first potential source is that 
the AAU may lobby for specific earmarks, and thus individual university lobby does not correctly assess the 
  26some of the top schools are engaged in regulatory policy-making, and the lobbying expenditures 
associated with these efforts will appear in the lobbying data.  Finally, top schools are just very 
different in nature than other schools.  To address these concerns, we exclude all institutions that 
have any department ranked in the top 20 in its respective field.  This represents 84 top caliber 
research institutions.  We repeat Model 4 without these institutions, and present the results in 
Model 11 of Table 7. 
 
***********INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE ********** 
 
Eliminating these top research institutions changes the magnitude of the coefficients, but 
do not change their sign or statistical significance.  The coefficient on the direct effect of 
lobbying is still not statistically significant.  The remaining coefficients of interest are 
statistically significant.  The effect of lobbying when there is SAC and HAC increases by 23 
percent and 36 percent, respectively.  These results together suggest that while on the whole, the 
results of the earlier models carry through, there are some small differences.  Moreover, the 
direct effect of lobbying for lower ranked institutions is higher than for top institutions.  This is 
consistent with an information story in which representatives know less about lower ranked 
institutions than they do about higher-ranked ones with higher visibility and status.  Thus, 
lobbying for earmark grants has higher returns for these lower-ranked institutions. 
A second alternative explanation is that lobbying is more like an investment in a stock, 
rather than a flow.  This would be consistent with James Snyder’s (1990, 1992) theory and 
analysis of PAC contributions. Snyder shows that PACs give money to candidates early in their 
careers – targeting individuals who are most likely to rise to more powerful positions – thus 
investing in politicians so that they earn a return at a later date.  Edward O. Laumann (1987) has 
also noted that relationships are at the basis of successful lobbying.    
We believe that in the case of educational earmarks, this is not a debilitating issue.  First, 
as noted earlier, each funding cycle seems distinct when it comes to educational earmarks.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
magnitude of the lobby effort.  The second source is that universities make contributions to the AAU which are 
recorded as lobbying on the university’s books.  The third source of measurement error arises from the fact that top 
universities lobby for science policy and earmarks, but all lobbying expenditures are being allocated to earmarks.   
The first two sources of measurement error are not problematic.  The AAU and other trade associations do not lobby 
for individual university earmarks.  Also, contributions universities make to trade associations are not reported as 
  27slate is “wiped clean” with respect to education earmarks each year, thus making lobbying less 
cumulative.  Second, nearly every institution in our data has hired outside lobbyists.  To the 
extent that the locus of the “relationship” is the lobbyist and not the institution per se, 
relationships are available for hire.  Presumably, the stronger the relationship between the 
lobbyist and the appropriations committee, the more valuable that relationship is on the market.  
This should then be reflected in the lobbying expenditure data as the price paid by the university 
for lobbying.   
Nevertheless, we explore this issue statistically by examining only those institutions that 
have not lobbied in the past and have switched to lobbying, and those institutions that have never 
lobbied.  By examining switchers, we can begin to separate out the effect of cumulative lobbying 
and one-period lobbying.  We assume that if an institution has not lobbied for two time periods, 
and lobbies in the third time period, it is new to lobbying and has not built up any reputation or 
relational capital in the current time period.  Thus, we eliminate all institutions that lobbied in the 
first two time periods of the data.  We then examine the third year of lobbying as cross sectional 
data, using instrumental variables.  All those remaining with positive observations of lobbying 
are switchers, and in Model 12 we compare their returns to those who have not lobbied.   
In Model 12, the coefficient on the direct returns to lobbying is still statistically 
insignificant, though it has changed sign.  The coefficient on the HAC*Lobbying variable is 
roughly the same as in Model 4, but is measured imprecisely.  This is likely due to the fact that 
there are only 2 new entrants to lobbying in 1999 (2 positive observations) in HAC districts, 
making tight standard errors extremely difficult to estimate.  However, the coefficient on the 
SAC*Lobbying variable is nearly eight times that of the same coefficient in Model 4, and is 
statistically significant at the 99 percent level of confidence.  The results seem to lend credibility 
to the argument that at least some aspects to lobbying are not cumulative.  In particular, the 
Senate effect seems to be substantive in the one-period lobbying game, and the House effect is of 
the same magnitude as earlier models, but measured imprecisely.  Overall, by utilizing the 
change in behavior by new entrants to lobbying, we generate some evidence that there is an 
individual year effect to lobbying, provided the university has representation on the HAC or 
SAC. 
                                                                                                                                                             
part of their lobbying expenditures.  The third source of measurement error is more problematic.  It is difficult to 
separate out how these top research universities allocate their lobbying efforts to science policy and earmarks.   
  28  A third concern, related to the first two in this section, is that although universities 
maintain well-staffed internal government relations departments, such internal lobbying efforts 
are focused on administrative regulation and general policy issues.  Instead, the real academic-
earmark lobbying is handled by external “guns for hire”.  That is, there are a number of firms 
(such as Cassidy & Associates) that are well known for their ability to gain earmarks for their 
clients, and these are really responsible for all earmark lobbying.  Indeed, Boston University, 
known for its focused earmark lobbying effort, uses only external lobbyists to obtain earmarks. 
  A correlation analysis reveals that top schools are more likely than lower-ranked schools 
to have internal lobbying departments (ρ  = .61).  In order to address the larger critique of 
mismeasurement in lobbying, we re-run our earlier base econometric models using only 
expenditures made by universities on external lobbyists.  The results are presented in Model 13.  
Again, the coefficients are slightly larger than those generated by our earlier models.  The 
average and marginal returns to lobbying are close to those of Model 4. 
  A final critique of the model is that in conducting this analysis, we miss the value of 
alumni networks.  We have four replies to this critique.  First, to the extent that enrollment is 
correlated with size of alumni network, and NAS Top Ranked School is correlated with “quality” 
of alumni, we control for the alumni effect.  When we re-run Model 4 with an interactive term of 
the two variables, the coefficient is not statistically significant.  Second, to the extent that alumni 
networks are effective, they are most likely to be effective with members of congress who are 
alumni of certain institutions.  We include these variables in the models and show, indeed, there 
is a HAC and SAC alumni effect in some estimations.  Third, the random effects estimator 
presented in Model 4 should control for unobserved institution-specific effects, including alumni 
networks.  Finally, the marginal benefit calculations in Table 5 of this paper show that although 
we cannot reject the possibility that MB=MC=1 for every dollar spent on lobbying, the point 
estimates of these coefficients in Model 2 imply a marginal return of $1.00 when lobbying with 
SAC representation and $1.29 when lobbying with HAC representation.  We can ask how much 
more lobbying would have to occur to obtain a result where marginal return to lobbying is $1.00 
with HAC representation.  This would represent an additional $53,000 in “unobservable” 
lobbying, or $230,000 in total lobbying, on average.  If universities with HAC representation 
lobbied at this level, then the average return would be $12.09 for every dollar spent on lobbying, 
nearly equivalent to the estimated average return with SAC representation.  We can conduct a 
  29similar exercise for Model 4, and find that unobservable lobbying would be $160,000 for 
universities with HAC representation and $50,000 for universities with SAC representation.  The 
magnitude of the calculated “unobserved lobbying” could account for the resources that alumni 
networks put into lobbying the government, but which is not disclosed.  Thus, unobservable 
lobbying, provided it is correlated with actual lobbying, would cause the results to be smaller, 
but still substantially significant. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Although scholars have made great progress during the last 65 years in analyzing the 
nature of interest group participation in government, measuring the returns to investments in 
lobbying has been elusive.  This paper has conducted a statistical analysis to measure the returns 
to lobbying by examining one aspect of interest group participation:  lobbying for educational 
earmarks.  Our results suggest an intriguing pattern in lobbying and earmarks.  The amount of 
educational earmark funding an institution receives is largely determined by the presence of a 
medical school and graduate programs, its overall departmental rankings, its lobbying efforts, 
and its representation in Congress.  Universities that are fortunate enough to be located in 
districts with elected representatives on the HAC and SAC are likely to receive enormous returns 
to their lobbying efforts.  The average return to lobbying for the average well-situated university, 
controlling for other factors, is 11-36 times its expenditures on the activity.  Despite this large 
average return to lobbying, we cannot reject the hypothesis that such universities invest in 
lobbying up to the point where the marginal benefit of further lobbying equals its marginal cost.  
We estimate that approximately 45 percent of universities are lobbying optimally, 6 percent are 
engaged in excessive lobbying, and 49 percent of universities are lobbying less than is optimal.  
Indeed, this paper suggests that the benefit curve to lobbying with representation is initially very 
steep, and then flattens out quickly, indicating that a small amount of lobbying can have 
substantial effects if institutions are represented by HAC and SAC members.  On the other hand, 
lobbying is relatively ineffective in obtaining earmarks for those universities represented by less 
powerful legislators.  We estimate that the return to lobbying for an average university without 
representation on the HAC or SAC is not statistically different from zero. Universities without 
such representation may find their money better spent lobbying for placement of their 
  30representatives on the HAC and SAC, rather than lobbying for the earmark directly in the current 
period.   
Our work, moreover, addresses the literature on committees.  When we control for the 
endogeneity of lobbying with instrumental variables, and control for the unobserved 
characteristics of lobbiers with a random effects model, we find that HAC and SAC members do 
send money to their districts in the absence of lobbying, although the effects of the HAC 
members are less robust that those of their Senate counterparts.  This is consistent with both a 
distributive and information story of committees—committee members do send money to their 
districts, and they rely on lobbying to inform them of how much to increment the earmark and 
where to target the money.  Thus, we believe that theories that combine distributional theories of 
congressional committees with informational models of lobbying may be a useful route for 
theorists to pursue. 
Although we have focused our work on lobbying for academic earmarks, we believe it is 
generalizable to a whole class of interest group rent-seeking, especially when federal spending is 
involved.  In these cases, politicians are likely to be exposed to re-election pressures, and sending 
targeted money to one’s own district is likely to enhance the probability of re-election (Steven D. 
Levitt and Snyder 1997).  In addition, unlike non-profit universities, most groups have multiple 
political instruments available to them:  lobbying, PAC contributions, grassroots organizing, 
political advertisements, and the like.  To the extent that groups can choose the most effective 
combination of instruments (where there may be complementarities between instruments) to 
achieve their goals, they may actually see higher returns to lobbying and political investment 
than do universities, which are largely constrained to only lobbying.   
With respect to the funding of universities, this paper has demonstrated that with the right 
representation, universities can see substantial returns to their investments in lobbying for 
earmarks.  Politicians are responsive to this kind of information and influence.  This paper also 
demonstrates that earmarks do redistribute research funds from universities that are top-ranked 
by the National Academy of Science to universities that have representation on the HAC and 
SAC.  The paper does not take a stand on whether earmarked academic funding or peer-reviewed 
competitive funding is a preferable distribution system.  Nevertheless, with 10 percent of the 
federal budget for university research currently distributed through earmarking, it would seem 
  31that academic administrators and politicians alike should be concerned about how this 
mechanism might change the nature of research at U.S. universities. 
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)Average Lobbying Expenditures Average Earmark
No Senate Appropriations Committee Member $9,430 $144,693
n=3442
Senate Appropriations Committee Member $5,595 $313,686
n=3704
No House Appropriations Committee Member $7,414 $187,331
n=6131
House Appropriations Committee Member $7,612 $503,839
n=1015
Average Lobbying Expenditures Average Earmark
No Senate Appropriations Committee Member $131,410 $1,157,920
n=247
Senate Appropriations Committee Member $117,750 $2,987,555
n=176
No House Appropriations Committee Member $125,225 $1,477,928
n=363
House Appropriations Committee Member $128,765 $4,588,803
n=60
TABLE 2:  MEANS IN LOBBYING AND EARMARKS
FOR ALL UNIVERSITIES IN DISTRICTS WITH AND WITHOUT APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERS



























































































































































































































































































































































































































9(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV Random Effects IV
Popular Belief Model Full Model Full Model Full Model
Ln(Lobby) 84.363*** 6.467 4.834 28.380
 (23.929) (21.840) (28.090) (17.536)
Ln(Lobby)*HAC 223.554* 376.142* 309.390***
 (129.591) (219.659) (36.059)
Ln(Lobby)*SAC 118.954** 166.874** 145.695***
 (48.211) (73.539) (22.457)
House Appropriations Committee (HAC) 297.390*** 146.923*** 81.015 88.825
 (104.501) (50.745) (76.689) (69.924)
Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) 178.184*** 106.509*** 129.523*** 104.833**
 (48.428) (31.167) (39.257) (49.673)
House Chair or Ranking Member 94.012 104.842 150.054 122.012
 (83.383) (82.472) (110.862) (83.310)
Senate Chair or Ranking Member -2.043 4.165 6.654 41.377
 (44.459) (40.254) (48.663) (42.030)
Representative ADA Score -1.377** -1.239** -1.656** -1.563**
 (0.641) (0.574) (0.676) (0.687)
Senator ADA Score 1.276 0.978 1.157 1.013
 (0.953) (0.850) (1.005) (0.833)
House Educator 64.557 53.278 59.780 71.234
 (60.239) (61.050) (88.907) (78.543)
Senate Educator 75.325 72.939 88.143 81.126
 (51.282) (49.134) (61.989) (61.852)
Alumni on HAC 164.904 226.990 361.396 321.284*
 (330.846) (300.570) (389.718) (180.550)
Alumni in House -19.918 -40.380 -103.728 -98.518
 (117.102) (119.863) (156.312) (96.191)
Alumni on SAC 974.785* 536.517 444.932 617.903**
 (539.549) (575.290) (711.908) (281.734)
Alumni in Senate -168.448 -55.126 -131.419 -125.517
 (250.376) (225.149) (317.724) (179.458)
NAS Top Ranked School -43.940* -42.573* -57.164** -57.728***
 (23.207) (22.544) (28.846) (12.950)
PhD Granting Institution 536.519*** 507.416*** 602.172*** 555.045***
(118.794) (113.647) (148.217) (97.005)
Private University -62.152 -49.694 -80.519 -89.811
(53.317) (52.959) (60.679) (70.647)
Medical School 1,555.289*** 1,478.922*** 1,813.270*** 1,825.021***
(471.155) (418.118) (508.208) (167.451)
Athletic Aid -4.984 -1.984 -13.628 -8.804
(46.792) (42.502) (54.074) (56.884)
Ln(Enrollment) 27.408 38.470* 36.701 33.819
(22.297) (19.946) (25.956) (34.951)
Rural Population (%) 44.795 78.106 99.752 106.352
(132.273) (132.434) (167.015) (184.458)
Ages 18-30 Population (%) 216.309 601.537 958.416 738.925
 (904.364) (847.181) (1,066.500) (1,369.045)
TABLE 4:  BASE ECONOMETRIC RESULTSCollege Degree Population (%) -211.788 -474.321 -1,111.680 -786.500
 (1,359.956) (1,463.817) (1,848.057) (1,518.414)
Employment in Education Sector (%) -3,712.787 -2,602.612 -4,027.615 -4,569.309
 (2,412.793) (2,438.962) (3,173.299) (4,063.190)
Median Income (000) -1.312 0.636 4.974 4.111
(5.546) (5.910) (7.787) (6.256)
Number of Universities in District 18.799** 16.352* 25.287** 23.931**
(9.393) (9.067) (11.891) (9.926)
Number of Universities in State -0.577 -0.669 -1.071 -0.878
(0.617) (0.554) (0.708) (0.570)
1997 -169.626*** -165.979***
 (30.731) (30.959)
1998 -72.460*** -69.115*** -64.387** -62.149**
(25.995) (26.507) (28.476) (26.465)
Constant -188.047 -352.904 -494.892 -416.154
(281.449) (251.070) (310.070) (419.423)
R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.25 .
F-Statistic 6.14 6.42 6.07 .
n 7,146 7,146 4,764 4,764
Robust and clustered standard errors are presented beneath coefficient estimates.








































































































































































































































































































































































Robust and clustered standard errors are presented beneath coefficient estimates.
*** 99% level of significance; ** 95% level of significance; * 90 percent level of significance
Note:  The coefficients on Model (8) are presented x1000 for easier interpretation.
(10)  Heckman Selection Model -- Select 
on Lobbying
TABLE 6:  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
(9)  Exclude Lag of Lobbying as 
Instrument
(8)  Linear Lobbying (Gamma = 1.00)
(7)  Gamma = 0.23
(6)  Take Out Community Colleges
(5)  Take Out California, Illinois, and 
Massachusetts UniversitiesVariable Ln(Lobby) Ln(Lobby)*HAC Ln(Lobby)*SAC
(11)  No Top Govt Funded Schools 20.34 421.09*** 187.05***
 (19.94) (51.82) (28.03)
(12)  First Time Lobbiers -160.39 324.53 1164.03***
 (300.98) (524.99) (553.57)
(13)  External Lobbying Only 22.57 405.29*** 175.52***
 (18.64) (148.87) (25.90)
Robust and clustered standard errors are presented beneath coefficient estimates.
** 95% level of significance; * 90 percent level of significance
Note:  The coefficients on lobbying for the external models (Model 10) is reported for external lobbying expenditures only.
TABLE 7:  MEASUREMENT AND ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESESAPPENDIX:  DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCE
Variable Definition (Source)
Earmarks
Total dollar appropriation of all academic earmarks to institution (Chronicle of Higher 
Education)
Lobbying
Total lobbying expenditures on behalf on institutions disclosed (Center for Responsive 
Politics, Clerk of the House) -- taken as log in most specifications.
House Appropriations Committee (HAC)
Dummy variable =1 if institution is represented by a legislator on the House Appropriations 
Committee and =0 otherwise
Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC)
Dummy variable =1 if institution is represented by a legislator on the Senate Appropriations 
Committee and =0 otherwise
House Chair or Ranking Member
Dummy variable =1 if institution is represented by a legislator who is a chair or ranking 
member of a House committee and =0 otherwise
Senate Chair or Ranking Member
Dummy variable =1 if institution is represented by a legislator who is a chair or ranking 
member of a Senate committee and =0 otherwise
Representative ADA Score The ADA score of the House member who represents the institution's district
Senator ADA Score The ADA score of the Senate member who represents the institution's district
House Educator
Dummy variable =1 if institution is represented by a House member who was a teacher, 
professor, or educational administrator before being elected to Congress, and =0 otherwise
Senate Educator
Dummy variable =1 if institution is represented by a Senate member who was a teacher, 
professor, or educational administrator before being elected to Congress, and =0 otherwise
Alumni on HAC
Dummy variable = 1 if institution has an alumus/a on the House Appropriations Committee, 
and = 0 otherwise
Alumni on SAC
Dummy variable = 1 if institution has an alumus/a on the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
and = 0 otherwise
Alumni in House
Dummy variable = 1 if institution has an alumus/a in the House of Representatives, and = 0 
otherwise
Alumni in Senate Dummy variable = 1 if institution has an alumus/a in the Senate, and = 0 otherwise
NAS Top Ranked School
The number of departments at the institution that are ranked in the top 20 by the National 
Academy of Science's 1995 rankings (National Academy of Science and National Science 
Foundation)
Degree PhD Dummy variable =1 if the institution awards a Ph.D., and =0 otherwise (IPEDS)
Private University Dummy variable = 1 if the institution is a private, =0 otherwise (IPEDS)
Medical School Dummy variable =1 if institution has a medical school, and =0 otherwise (IPEDS)
Athletic Aid
Dummy variable =1 if institution offers athletic scholarships to students, and =0 otherwise 
(IPEDS)
Enrollment Total student enrollment (IPEDS) -- taken as log.
Rural Population (%) % Rural Population in House District (Census)
Ages 18-30 Population (%) % Population ages 18-30 in House District (Census)
College Degree Population (%) % Population with College Degree in House District (Census)
Employment in Education Sector (%) % of Workers employed in Education Sector in House District (Census)
Median Income Median Income in House District (Census)
Number of Universities in District Count of the number of universities in the congressional district
Number of Universities in State Count of the number of universities in the state
Overhead Rate The federally negotiated on-campus overhead rate for universities in April (HHS)